Negligent Ecocide

This blog has noted before that BP insists it has been a “model of corporate social responsibility,” which is precisely why we have doomed Life on the Planet as We know It.

Dick Cheney full over the head mask in Soft Vinyl
The simile Professor Joe uses is the “Sadim” touch. This blog prefers the image of Bobcat Goldthwait in Scrooged with his double barrel shotgun. Except he is wearing a Dick Cheney mask and has Deep Water Well Drilling Permits stuffed in his back pocket.

On May 9, Climate Progress reported that “an expert reviewer found the well’s cement seal was probably faulty and inadequately tested (to save money).” In a new report the presidential commission that investigated the disaster indicates that BP and Halliburton knew the cement was unstable and used it anyway to ’seal’ the Macondo well.

Halliburton and BP knew weeks before the fatal explosion of the Macondo well in the Gulf of Mexico that the cement mixture they planned to use to seal the bottom of the well was unstable but still went ahead with the job, the presidential commission investigating the accident said on Thursday.

It should surprise no one Halliburton that the energy giant formerly run by Dick Cheney is culpable (see “BP oil disaster is Cheney’s Katrina“). As the NYT editorialized today:

The report has plenty of blame to go around. And it leaves the clear impression that two of the most important players in the risky world of deep-water drilling were doing their job on the cheap.

According to the report, Halliburton conducted three tests on the cement mixture it planned to use. All showed the mixture to be unstable, and, thus vulnerable to the high-pressure pool of oil and gas at the bottom of the well. It said Halliburton provided the results of one of these tests to BP on March 8 and that BP failed to act on it: “There is no indication that Halliburton highlighted to BP the significance of the foam instability data or that BP personnel raised any questions about it.”

Halliburton carried out a fourth, and differently designed, test that suggested the cement slurry was stable. But there is no doubt that the mixture actually used was fatally flawed. The report emphasizes that faulty cement was only one of a cascade of events, including the failure of the blowout preventer.

This investigation is far from over. What we know so far is deeply unsettling and good reason for the commission to keep probing.

Gee, don’t you think that Washington Theater is living up to the previews for an entertaining season? I thought the actor that played the deeply unsettled commissioner was especially good. Was that Robert Macondo?

Other AG liner notes for the Percussion Section:

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5 Comments

  1. jcwinnie
    Posted 2010-10-29 at 1:53 pm | Permalink

    Halliburton has downplayed “the significance of cement testing results released publicly by the national oil spill commission, and attempted to shift responsibility for the massive Gulf oil spill to BP.”

  2. jcwinnie
    Posted 2010-10-29 at 2:05 pm | Permalink

    And, speaking of well-paid, bad actors from the entertaining legislative industry, we learn from the Gray Lady that Exxon Mobil Corporation, the world’s largest publicly traded oil company, has reported “its quarterly profit rose 55 percent” to $7.35 billion, “surpassing expectations, as higher crude prices lifted results in its exploration business.”

  3. jcwinnie
    Posted 2010-10-30 at 8:28 am | Permalink

    MoJo Kate Sheppard notes that the report concludes, “while there are tests designed to ensure that a cement job is stable and methods to remedy it if they are found to be faulty,” “BP and/or Transocean personnel misinterpreted or chose not to conduct such tests at the Macondo well.”

  4. jcwinnie
    Posted 2010-10-30 at 11:42 am | Permalink

    For HuffPo Robert L. Cavnar has a different take of the Commission’s report:

    Bad cement jobs in the oil and gas industry are common, and there are several ways to remediate those bad jobs after the fact. It’s very difficult to determine if a cement job is not effective, even with a bond log, especially in the early hours after a cement job has been pumped. Bond logs are often inconclusive and the longer cement has to hydrate and gain compressive strength, the higher the likelihood of a better log. As we all know from the Deepwater Horizon story, there were only about 16 hours from the time the cement job was pumped to the negative test, riser displacement, and the subsequent blowout.

    The overriding issues here are casing design and risk management. Relying solely on the cement job to prevent the well from coming to see them was poor decision making. I continue to believe that their decision to run only the long string, rather than a liner/tieback combination, as well as the decisions to not wait on more centralizers or to not circulate bottoms up, was BP and Transocean’s concern about getting pipe to bottom and getting cement in place, not money. This well had been scary difficult to drill, losing circulation, then kicking, that they just wanted to get off as quickly as possible. This rush to get the well finished lead to the disaster. Add that to displacing the riser with seawater with questionable well integrity was the final straw. After the blowout, the inhibited alarms and safety shutdowns on the Transocean rig proved deadly.

    This disaster was certainly preventable and caused by poor design, poor decision making, and rushing to get the well completed. The tragic consequences should be a lesson to the entire industry, but I’m not holding my breath.

  5. jcwinnie
    Posted 2010-10-31 at 8:54 am | Permalink

    Disaster on the Horizon
    Mr. Cavnar is the author of Disaster on the Horizon: High Stakes, High Risks, and the Story Behind the Deepwater Well Blowout.

    A 30-year veteran of the oil industry, who’s lived the industry from the oil patch to the boardroom, Mr. Cavnar writes about the BP blowout, oil technology, oil politics and energy policy in clear-eyed prose intelligible to those who only consume, rather than produce, petroleum products.

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